The traditional understanding of abstraction operates on the basis of the assumption that only entities are subject to thought processes in which particulars are disregarded and commonalities are lifted out (the so-called method of genus proximum and differentia specifica). On this basis Frege criticized the notion of abstraction and convincingly argued that (this kind of) “entitary- directed” abstraction can never provide us with any numbers. However, Frege did not consider the alternative of “property- abstraction.” In this article an argument for (...) this alternative kind of abstraction is formulated by introducing a notion of the “modal universality” of the arithmetical and by developing it in terms of the distinction between type-laws (laws for entities – applicable to a limited class of entities) and modal laws (obtaining for every possible entity without any restriction). In order to substantiate this argument a case is made for the acceptance of an ontic foundation for the arithmetical (and other modes or functions of reality – with special reference to Cassirer, Bernays, Gödel and Wang), which, in the final section, serves to give an ontological account of (i) the connections between the arithmetical and other aspects of reality and (ii) the applicabality of arithmetic. In the course of the argument the impasse of logicism is briefly highlighted, while a few remarks are made with regard to the logical subject- object relation in connection with Frege's view that number attaches to a concept. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(1) 2003: 63-80. (shrink)

By taking serious a remark once made by Paul Bernays, namely that an account of the nature of rationality should begin with concept-formation, this article sets out to uncover both the restrictive and the expansive boundaries of rationality. In order to do this some implications of the perennial philosophical problem of the “coherence of irreducibles” will be related to the acknowledgement of primitive terms and of their indefinability. Some critical remarks will be articulated in connection with an over-estimation of rationality (...) – concerning the influence of Kant's view of human understanding as the formal law-giver of nature (the supposedly “rational structure of the world”), and the apparently innocent (subjectivist) habit to refer to experiential entities as 'objects'. The other side of the coin will be highlighted with reference to those kinds of knowledge transcending the limits of concept-formation – culminating in formulating the four most basic idea-statements philosophy can articulate about the universe. What is found “in-between” these (restrictive) and (expansive) boundaries of rationality will then briefly be placed within the contours of a threefold perspective on the self-insufficiency of logicality – as merely one amongst many more dimensions conditioning human life. Although the meaning of the most basic logical principles – such as the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason – will surface in our analysis, exploring some of the complex issues in this respect, such as the relationship between thought and language, will not be analysed. The important role of solidarity – as the basis of critique – will be explained and related both to the role of immanent criticism in rational conversation and the importance of acknowledging what is designated as the principle of the excluded antinomy (which in an ontic sense underlies the logical principle of non-contradiction). The last section of our discussion will succinctly illuminate the proper place of the inevitable trust we ought to have in rationality – while implicitly warning against the rationalistic over-estimation of it (its degeneration into a rationalist “faith in reason”). Our intention is to enhance an awareness of the reality that rationality is embedded in and borders on givens which are not open to further “rational” exploration – givens that both condition (in a constitutive sense) and transcend the limits of conceptual knowledge. Some of the distinctions and insights operative in our analysis are explained in Strauss 2000 and 2003. Yet, most of the systematic perspectives found in this analysis of rationality are only developed in this article for the first time. Since a different study is required to discuss related problems and results found within cognitive science, it cannot be discussed within one article. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(3) 2003: 247–266. (shrink)

The Systems Theory is a complex theory (yet it is not identical to recent theories of complexity). The intention of this qualification is to demonstrate that the concept of a system is a complex basic concept of scientific thinking. This means that it is defined in terms of various elementary basic concepts brought together in its explication. The definition given by Von Bertalanffy to the concept of a system employs conceptual elements coming from at least five prominent conceptual clusters. In (...) order to highlight the nature and interrelations between these clusters this article focuses upon perennial philosophical issues which present themselves within the definition of a system. They are those of stability and change, the one and the many (unity and multiplicity), the whole and its parts, and the relation between the material and the vital. An analysis of the interrelations between these clusters provides the basis for an assessment of the scope and limitations Von Bertalanffy's concept of a system. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(3) 2002: 163-179. (shrink)

Because Gadamer is very sensitive to the role of history, tradition and authority within human life, the overall intention of this article will be to unveil major elements of modern philosophy which exerted an influence upon his thought. In this sense it can be seen as applying his notion of 'Wirkungsgeschichte' to an assessment of certain aspects of his own thought. Particularly in his view on causality and history Gadamer illustrates the intimate connection of his thought with the dialectics of (...) nature and freedom. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(4) 2002: 291-305. (shrink)